Ϊʲô¶íÂÞ˹²»»á·¢Éú½ðÈÚΣ»ú£¿

2015Äê06ÔÂ12ÈÕ 15:21  ×÷Õß:Chatham House  (0)+1

¡¡¡¡ÎÄ/ÐÂÀ˲ƾ­Òâ¼ûÁìÐä(΢ÐŹ«ÖÚºÅkopleader)»ú¹¹×¨À¸ ²éËþÄ·ÖÇ¿â ×÷Õß Àí²éµÂ-¿µÄÉÀû(Richard Connolly£¬Ó¢¹ú»Ê¼Ò¹ú¼ÊÊÂÎñÑо¿Ëù¶íÂÞ˹ÓëÅ·ÑÇÏîÄ¿¸±Ñо¿Ô±)

¡¡¡¡²»ÉÙÈËÈÏΪ£¬ÅÓ´óµÄÍâÕ®Óë²»¶ÏήËõµÄ¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸Ô¤Ê¾×ŶíÂÞ˹±Ø½«·¢ÉúÒ»³¡½ðÈÚΣ»ú¡£µ«ÉîÈë·ÖÎöÖ®ºó·¢ÏÖ£¬¶íÂÞ˹µÄÍâÕ®ÎÊÌâ±»ÑÏÖØ¿ä´ó£¬³öÏÖÀàËÆ1998Äê½ðÈÚΣ»úµÄ¿ÉÄÜÐÔ¼¸ºõ²»´æÔÚ¡£Ïà±È֮ϣ¬¶íÂÞ˹Íâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×ʵIJ»¶ÏÏ»¬¸üΪÁîÈ˵£ÓÇ¡£

¶íÂÞ˹ΪºÎ²»»á·¢Éú½ðÈÚΣ»ú£¿¶íÂÞ˹ΪºÎ²»»á·¢Éú½ðÈÚΣ»ú£¿

¡¡¡¡¾¡¹Ü¶íÂÞ˹¾­¼ÃÐÎÊÆÒÀÈ»ºÜÑϾþ£¬µ«¹ØÓÚ¶íÂÞ˹ÍâÕ®µÄÎÊÌâÒ»Ö±±»¿ä´ó¡£

¡¡¡¡Though the country still faces difficult economicconditions, the problem of external debt has been exaggerated¡£

¡¡¡¡ÓÉÓÚ´óÁ¿ÍâÕ®ÃæÁÙµ½ÆÚ³¥»¹£¬ÈËÃDz²â¶íÂÞ˹¿ÉÄÜ»áÔÚ²»Ô¶µÄ½«À´¾­ÀúÒ»³¡½ðÈÚΣ»ú¡£È»¶ø¶ÔÓÚ¶íÂÞ˹µÄÕþ²ßÖƶ¨Õ߶øÑÔ£¬ÕâЩ½ðÈÚÎÊÌⲢûÓбíÃæÉÏ¿´ÆðÀ´ÄÇôÁîÈ˵£ÓÇ¡£¶íÂÞ˹µÄÍâÕ®ºÜ´óÒ»²¿·Ö²¢·ÇÓÉÎ÷·½ÒøÐгÖÓУ¬¶øÊÇ×¢²áÔÚ¹úÍâµÄÆäËû¶íÂÞ˹ĸ¹«Ë¾»ò¿Ø¹É¹«Ë¾¡£ÕâÖÖ¡°¼¯ÍÅÄÚ²¿¡±Õ®ÎñºÜÈÝÒ×ÖØÐÂЭ¶¨£¬Òâζ×ŶíÂÞ˹²»¿ÉÄÜ·¢Éú»õ±ÒΣ»ú¡£Ïà·´£¬ÆäËûһЩָ±ê£¬±ÈÈçÍâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×Ê(FDI)£¬¶Ô¾­¼Ã½¡¿µ¶ÈËù·¢³öµÄÐźŷ´¶ø¸üӦעÒâ¡£

¡¡¡¡A large volume of scheduled external debt repaymentshas led to speculation that Russia could experience a financial crisis in thenear future. However, these financial vulnerabilities are not as worrying toRussian policy-makers as they might appear. A significant share of Russia¡¯sexternal debt is owed not to Western banks, but instead to other Russian parentor holding companies registered abroad. This ¡®intra-group¡¯ debt is easilyrescheduled, which means that Russia is unlikely to suffer a currency crisis ¨Cthough other indicators, such as foreign direct investment, are more worryingfor the health of the economy¡£

¡¡¡¡ÍⴢϽµµÄ±³ºó

¡¡¡¡The dynamics behind falling reserves

¡¡¡¡È¥Ä궬¼¾Â¬²¼·è¿ñ±áÖµ£¬°éËæ¶íÂÞ˹ÍⴢϽµ£¬Éú¶¯µØÕ¹ÏÖÁ˶íÂÞ˹¾­¼ÃµÄÆ£ÈíÒÔ¼°ÓͼÛϵø¶ÔÆä³å»÷Ö®´ó¡£

¡¡¡¡The dramatic depreciation of the roubleover the winter, along with a decline in Russia¡¯s international reserves,vividly illustrated Russia¡¯s economic weaknesses and vulnerability to decliningoil prices¡£

¡¡¡¡È»¶ø£¬È¥ÄêËļ¾¶È¬²¼±ÀÀ£ÓÐÒ»¸öÖ÷ÒªÔ­ÒòÓëÓͼÛϵø²¢ÎÞÖ±½Ó¹ØÁª¡£ÄǾÍÊÇÍâÕ®³¥»¹¶îµÄ¼¤Ôö¸ø¬²¼´øÀ´ÏÂÐÐѹÁ¦¡£ÓÉÓÚÎ÷·½¹ú¼Ò¶Ô¶íÂÞ˹ʵʩ½ðÈÚÖƲ㬴óÁ¿¶íÂÞ˹ÆóÒµ½øÈëÎ÷·½×ʱ¾Êг¡µÄͨµÀ»ù±¾±»¶ÂËÀ£¬¶ø²»½ö½öÊÇÖƲÃÃûµ¥ÉϵÄÄÇЩÆóÒµ¡£

¡¡¡¡However, one of the principal causes of therouble¡¯s poor performance in the final quarter of 2014 was not directly relatedto the falling price of oil. Instead, a spike in external debt repayments alsocreated downward pressure on the rouble. Because of financial sanctions imposedby Western states, access to Western capital markets was effectively closed toa large number of Russian corporations, and not just those directly targeted bysanctions¡£

¡¡¡¡ÓÉÓÚÎÞ·¨ÎªÏÖÓÐÕ®Îñ»ñµÃÔÙÈÚ×Ê£¬¶íÂÞ˹ÆóÒµ±»ÆÈ°´ÆÚ³¥»¹Õ®Îñ¡£Æä½á¹ûÊÇ£¬¶íÂÞ˹µÄ×ÜÍâÕ®´Ó2014Äê1Ô·ݴóÔ¼7280ÒÚÃÀÔª½µÖÁ2014Äêµ×µÄ5970ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£ÍâÕ®´æÁ¿Èñ¼õ³¬¹ý1300ÒÚÃÀÔª£¬°üÀ¨³¥Õ®(Ö÷ÒªÊÇÏòÎ÷·½ÒøÐÐ)ÒÔ¼°ÒÔ¬²¼¼Æ¼ÛÕ®ÎñµÄÃÀÔª¼ÛÖµµÄËõ¼õ¡£

¡¡¡¡Unable to refinance existing debt, Russianfirms were forced to repay their debts on schedule. As a result, Russia¡¯s totalexternal debt fell from around $728 billion in January 2014 to $597 billion atthe end of 2014. This sharp reduction of over $130 billion in the stock ofexternal debt was due to a combination of repayments (primarily to Westernbanks) and a reduction in the dollar value of rouble-denominated debt¡£

¡¡¡¡2014Äêµ×˽ÈË×ʱ¾¼ÓËÙÁ÷³öÔøÒýÆðÒ»Õóºä¶¯£¬¾Ý¹ÀËã2014Äê×ÜÁ÷³ö´ïµ½1540ÒÚÃÀÔª£¬ÉÏÊö±»Æȳ¥»¹ÍâÕ®ÖÁÉÙÊÇÍƶ¯ÒòËØÖ®Ò»¡£Õâ·´¹ýÀ´µ¼Ö¶íÂÞ˹Íâ»ã´¢±¸Ï½µ£¬ÒòΪÆóÒµÐèÒª½«Â¬²¼¶Ò»»³ÉÍâ»ãÀ´³¥»¹ÍâÕ®¡£2014Ä꣬¶íÂÞ˹¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸´ÓÄê³õµÄ5100ÒÚÃÀÔª½µÖÁÄêÄ©µÄ3880ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£Ä¿Ç°¶íÂÞ˹ÍⴢΪ3560ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£

¡¡¡¡Thesurge in net private capital outflows that attracted much excitement at the endof 2014 ¨C estimated to have reached $154 billion in 2014 -- was at leastpartially driven by these forced external debt repayments. This in turncontributed to the reduction in Russia¡¯s foreign exchange reserves as roubleswere exchanged for foreign currency to service external debt obligations. Overthe course of 2014, Russia¡¯s international reserves dwindled from $510 billionat the beginning of the year to $388 billion at the end of the year. Today,they stand at $356 billion¡£

¡¡¡¡½ðÈÚµ¯ÐÔ

¡¡¡¡Financial flexibility

¡¡¡¡²¿·ÖѧÕߣ¬±ÈÈç´óÎ÷ÑóÀíÊ»á(Atlantic Council)µÄ°²µÂ˹-°¬Ë¹ÂصÂ(Anders Aslund)£¬ÈÏΪÍⴢϽµÓë¸ß¶îÍâÕ®½áºÏÆðÀ´½«Íþв¶íÂÞ˹µÄ½ðÈÚÎȶ¨¡£ËûÈÏΪÕâÀïÓÐÁ½´óÔ­Òò£¬Ò»ÊǶíÂÞ˹µÄ¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸Á÷¶¯ÐÔ²»×㣬ÄÑÒÔÓÃÀ´³¥»¹ÍâÕ®£¬¶þÊǶíÂÞ˹½üÆÚÐè³¥»¹µÄÍâÕ®¹æÄ£³¬¹ýÁËÁ¢¼´¿ÉÓõĴ¢±¸Ë®Æ½¡£ÆäʵÕâÁ½µã¶¼ÓÐЩ¿ä´óÆä´Ê¡£

¡¡¡¡Some, such as the Atlantic Council¡¯s AndersAslund, have suggested that this cocktail of declining reserves and high externaldebt threatens the financial stability of Russia. This is, he suggests, because(a) Russia¡¯s international reserves might not be liquid enough to be used tomeet external financial obligations; and (b) Russia¡¯s foreign debt obligationsin the near future exceed the readily available stock of reserves. However,both claims are exaggerated¡£

¡¡¡¡Ê×ÏÈ£¬¶íÂÞ˹µÄ¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸ÊǾßÓÐÁ÷¶¯ÐԵġ£ÕâÒ»µã±¾-°¢Àï˹(Ben Aris)×î½üÔÚ¡¶BNE¡··¢±íµÄÎÄÕ½²µÃºÜÇå³þ¡£

¡¡¡¡First, Russia¡¯s international reserves areliquid, as clearly documented by Ben Aris in a recent BNE article¡£

¡¡¡¡µÚ¶þµã´ó¼Ò½²µÄ±È½ÏÉÙ£¬ÄǾÍÊǶíÂÞ˹δÀ´Á½Äêµ½ÆÚµÄÍâÕ®²¢²»Ïñ¿´ÉÏÈ¥ÄÇô¹æÄ£ÅӴ󡣸ù¾Ý¶íÂÞ˹ÑëÐÐ[΢²©]ÍøÕ¾¹«²¼µÄÊý¾Ý£¬2015Äê¼Æ»®³¥»¹µÄÍâÕ®¹æģΪÂÔµÍÓÚ750ÒÚÃÀÔª(ÆäÖÐ2015Äê1-5ÔÂΪ450ÒÚÃÀÔª)¡¢2016Äê680ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£ÕâÒâζ×ÅÔÚ2016Äêµ×֮ǰ£¬¼Æ»®³¥»¹µÄÍâÕ®¹æģΪÂÔ¸ßÓÚ1400ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£½«ÆäÓë´óÔ¼3500ÒÚÃÀÔªµÄ¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸Ïà¶ÔÕÕ£¬×ÔÈ»¿´ÆðÀ´¹æÄ£¹ý´óºÍÁîÈ˵£ÓÇÁË¡£

¡¡¡¡Second, and less widely documented, is thefact that Russia¡¯s foreign debt obligations over the next two years are not asimposing as might first appear. According to data publically available on theBank of Russia website, a little under $75 billion of external debt repaymentsare scheduled to be repaid over 2015 (a further $45 billion was scheduled forrepayment between January and May 2015)£¬ and $68 billion over 2016. That meansthat between now and the end of 2016, over $140 billion is currently scheduledto be repaid. Set against around $350 billion in international reserves, thislooks like a substantial and worrying amount¡£

¡¡¡¡È»¶øÊÂʵÉÏ£¬¶íÂÞ˹¼Æ»®³¥»¹µÄÍâÕ®ÖкܴóÒ»²¿·ÖÊǶԶíÂÞ˹ծÎñÈËËù¿Ø¹É»ò¹ØÁªµÄÒøÐлòÆäËûÆóҵʵÌåµÄÒåÎñ¡£»»¾ä»°Ëµ£¬ÆäÖÐÓкܴóÒ»²¿·ÖÊǼ¯ÍÅÄÚ²¿Õ®Îñ£¬¼´¶íÂÞ˹ÆóÒµ´ÓÓëÆäÃÜÇйØÁªµÄÔÚ¾³Íâ×¢²áµÄʵÌåʵʩµÄ½è¿î£¬¿ÉÄܳöÓÚ¡°Ë°ÊÕЧÂÊ¡±µÈÄ¿µÄ¡£´ËÀàÕ®ÎñºÜÈÝÒ×Õ¹ÆÚ£¬Òò´Ë²¢²»¹¹³É¡°Ó²ÐÔ¡±³¥Õ®ÒåÎñ¡£

¡¡¡¡However, much of Russia¡¯s scheduledexternal debt repayments consist of obligations to banks or other corporateentities that either own or are linked with the Russian debtors. In otherwords, there is significant ¡®intra-group¡¯ debt, where Russian firms borrow fromclosely-linked entities registered offshore for the purpose of ¡®taxefficiency¡¯, for example. Such debt can be easily rescheduled and does notconstitute a ¡®hard¡¯ debt obligation¡£

¡¡¡¡ÄÇô¼¯ÍÅÄÚ²¿Õ®Îñµ½µ×Õ¼¶íÂÞ˹ÍâÕ®±ÈÖصĶàÉÙÄØ£¿×ÜÌå¶øÑÔ´óÔ¼Õ¼×ÜÍâÕ®µÄËÄ·ÖÖ®Ò»¡£µ«¸üÖØÒªµÄÊÇ£¬ËüÕ¼2015ÄêºÍ2016Äê¼Æ»®³¥»¹Õ®Îñ¶îµÄÒ»°ë×óÓÒ¡£ÕâÒâζ×ÅδÀ´18¸öÔ¶íÂÞ˹ÆóÒµ¡°Ó²ÐԵġ±ÍâÕ®³¥¸¶¶î¸ü½Ó½ü700ÒÚÃÀÔª¶ø·Ç1400ÒÚÃÀÔª¡£¿¼Âǵ½¶íÂÞ˹ÒÀÈ»½Ï¸ßµÄ¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸£¬ÒÔ¼°Ðí¶àÆóÒµÒÀÈ»³ÖÐø²úÉú´óÁ¿Íâ»ãÊÕÈ룬ÕâÒ»Êý¶î²¢²»ÄÜÈöíÂÞ˹Õþ²ßÖƶ¨Õßµ£ÓÇ¡£

¡¡¡¡Just how much of Russia¡¯s external debtdoes intra-group debt account for? Overall, it accounts for around a quarter oftotal external debt. But even more importantly, it accounts for around half ofthe repayments that are scheduled for 2015 and 2016. This means that the total¡®hard¡¯ external debt repayments over the next 18 months amounts to a figurenearer $70 billion than $140 billion. Given Russia¡¯s still substantialinternational reserves, and the fact that many firms continue to generate largevolumes of foreign currency revenues, this amount will not worry policy-makersin Russia¡£

¡¡¡¡Õ¹ÍûδÀ´£¬ÓÉÓÚ¶íÂÞ˹´óÁ¿ÍâÕ®¿ÉÄܱ»Õ¹ÆÚ£¬ÎÒÃÇÔ¤¼Æ×ÜÍâÕ®´æÁ¿Ï½µËÙ¶ÈÓ¦¸Ã·Ç³£»ºÂý£¬¶ø¼¯ÍÅÄÚ²¿Õ®ÎñµÄ±ÈÖØÉÏÉý¡£ÕâÓ¦¸ÃÒâζ×Å×ܵĶÌÆÚÕ®ÎñÊý¾Ý½«»áÉÏÉý£¬¿ÉÄÜ¿´ÆðÀ´±È½ÏÏÅÈË£¬µ«ÕýÈç±¾ÎÄËùÖ¸³öµÄ£¬¶ÔÊý¾ÝÉîÈë·ÖÎöÖ®ºó·¢ÏÖʵ¼Ê½á¹û²¢Ã»ÓÐÄÇô¿ÉÅ¡£

¡¡¡¡Looking to the future, because much ofRussia¡¯s external debt will likely be rescheduled, we should expect to see thetotal stock of external debt decline quite slowly, and the share of intra-groupdebt to rise. This should mean that the headline short-term debt figure willgrow and perhaps appear disconcertingly high. But, as this note shows, acareful reading of the data should lead to a less alarming conclusion¡£

¡¡¡¡Í¶×ÊϽµµÄÍþв

¡¡¡¡Threat of declining investment

¡¡¡¡ÕâÊÇ·ñÒâζ×ŶíÂÞ˹¾­¼Ã·Ç³£½¡È«ÄØ£¿Äǵ¹²»¼ûµÃ£¬µ«ÎÒÃÇ¿ÉÒÔ˵¶íÂÞ˹·¢Éú½ðÈÚΣ»úµÄ¿ÉÄÜÐԺܵ͡£µ±È»£¬Èç¹ûÔٴγöÏÖÓͼÛͻȻºÍ³ÖÐøϵø£¬ÒÀÈ»»áÔì³ÉºÜ¶àÎÊÌâ¡£µ«ÊÇÔÚÓͼÛÏà¶ÔÎȶ¨µÄ¼ÙÉèÇ龳ϣ¬ÅÓ´óµÄÍâÕ®¸ºµ£µ¼Ö¶íÂÞ˹·¢ÉúÀàËÆ1998Äê8Ô½ðÈÚΣ»úµÄ¿ÉÄÜÐÔ¼¸ºõûÓС£

¡¡¡¡Does this mean that the Russian economy issafe? Well, it does mean that the likelihood of a financial crisis is quitelow. Of course, another sudden and sustained decline in the price of oil wouldcause problems. But in a relatively benign baseline scenario of stable oilprices, it is unlikely that onerous external debt repayments will cause adramatic financial crisis like the one Russia suffered in August 1998.

¡¡¡¡²»ÐÒµÄÊÇ£¬¶íÂÞ˹ÆäËû¾­¼ÃÖ¸±ê¿´ÆðÀ´¸üΪÁîÈ˵£ÓÇ¡£±ÈÈç˵£¬Íâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×ÊÁ÷ÈëÒѾ­½µÖÁ¼«¶ËµÍλ¡£2014ÄêÏ°ëÄ꣬¶íÂÞ˹Íâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×ÊÁ÷ÈëΪ¸ºÖµ¡£¾¡¹ÜÕâ²¢·ÇûÓÐÏÈÀý£¬ÕâÒ»ÊÂʵÓëͶ×ʼÓËÙήËõ·ÅÔÚÒ»ÆðÈ¥¿´£¬ËµÃ÷¶íÂÞ˹µÄͶ×ÊÇ°¾°·Ç³£÷öµ­¡£

¡¡¡¡Unfortunately for Russia, other economicindicators look more worrying. For example, inflows of foreign directinvestment (IFDI) in Russia have fallen to worrying levels. In the second halfof 2014, IFDI was negative. While this is not unprecedented, the fact that itaccompanied a wider contraction in investment indicates that the prospects forinvestment in Russia appear bleak¡£

¡¡¡¡ÕâÒ»µã¼«ÆäÖØÒª£¬ÒòΪÍâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×ÊÁ÷ÈëÊǿƼ¼ºÍ¼¼ÄܵĹؼüÀ´Ô´¡£Èç¹ûÕâÒ»Ç÷ÊƳÖÐøÏÂÈ¥£¬¶íÂÞ˹×ÜͶ×ʵÄЧÂʽ«»áϽµ£¬ÀͶ¯Éú²úÂÊÔö³¤½«»á·ÅÂý£¬¶íÂÞ˹µÄ¹ú¼Ê¾ºÕùÁ¦½«»á½øÒ»²½Ï½µ£¬´Ó¶ø×îÖÕÔì³ÉÈËÃÇÉú»îˮƽϽµ¡£

¡¡¡¡This is of tremendous importance becauseIFDI is a crucial source of technology and knowhow. If this trend persists, theeffectiveness of Russia¡¯s aggregate investment will decline, productivitygrowth will slow, Russia¡¯s international competitiveness will slump further,and ultimately living standards will fall¡£

¡¡¡¡µã»÷´Ë´¦£¬ÔĶÁÔ­ÎÄ

¡¡¡¡(±¾ÎÄ×÷Õß½éÉÜ£º²éËþÄ·Öǿ⣬ÊÇÒ»¼Ò¶ÀÁ¢µÄÕþ²ßÑо¿Ëù£¬×ܲ¿Î»ÓÚÂ׶ء£ÆäÈÎÎñÊÇ°ïÖú½¨Á¢Ò»¸ö¿É³ÖÐøµÄ°²È«¡¢·±Èٺ͹«ÕýµÄÊÀ½ç¡£)

¡¡¡¡±¾ÎÄΪ×÷Õ߶À¼ÒÊÚȨÐÂÀ˲ƾ­Ê¹Óã¬ÇëÎðתÔØ¡£Ëù·¢±íÑÔÂÛ²»´ú±í±¾Õ¾¹Ûµã¡£

¡¡¡¡¡¶È«ÇòÐÂÎÅÑÛ¡·ÊÇÒ»µµÓÉÐÂÀ˲ƾ­È«Çò¼ÇÕߺÍ׫¸åÈËÍŶÓΪÄú³ÊÏÖµÄÔ­´´×¨À¸¼¯¡£ÕæÏàÔ¶±È¼ÛÖµ¹Û¸üÖØÒª¡£¾´Çë¹ØעȫÇòÐÂÎÅÑÛ΢ÐŹ«ÖںţºÈ«ÇòÐÂÎÅÑÛ¡£É¨Âë¸ü·½±ã¡£

È«ÇòÐÂÎÅÑÛ

ÎÄÕ¹ؼü´Ê£º ¶íÂÞ˹¾­¼ÃΣ»úÍâ»ã´¢±¸¹ú¼Ê´¢±¸ÍâÕ®Íâ¹úÖ±½ÓͶ×ÊFDI

·ÖÏíµ½:
±£´æ  |  ´òÓ¡  |  ¹Ø±Õ
¹ÉÊоÞÕðÒý³öÀ´µÄ¾³ÍâÊÆÁ¦ ÓëÍõÁÖºÏÓ°µÄÈ˲»Ó¦¸Ã±»³°Ð¦ Öܱ߹ú¼Ò¿´ºÃÒ»´øһ·ÏîÄ¿Âð ¹ØÓÚ¶à²ã´Î×ʱ¾Êг¡ÌåϵµÄÊ®µã˼¿¼ ¡°Ò»´øһ·¡±ÐèÒª¿××ÓʳÌà AAÖÆʱµã¹ó²ËµÄÈË°®Õ¼±ãÒË£¿ ÃÀ¹ÉÈëÃÅ£ºÈçºÎÕÒµ½ÖµµÃͶ×ʵĹÉƱ£¿ A¹ÉÊг¡µÄ²»ÕñÊDz»Õý³£µÄ ÅãͬºúÒ«°î¿¼²ì½­Î÷ºÍ¸£½¨ A¹ÉΪºÎ¡°Å£Ê§Ç°Ì㡱£¿