文/新浪财经专栏作者 迈克尔-斯宾塞
金融业，监管者和政治领袖们要共同对整个经济负责。这种价值应该牢牢灌输在行业中——职业操守应比规则更为严格，它将超越险隘的私利或是利用信息来谋利行为。这将成为从业者日常的指导准则和道德约束。这有助于引起人们关注金融对经济的影响，重建信任。
环顾世界，有关金融监管的辩论如火如荼。许多建议和方案纷纷出炉，相互的争论导致社会舆论和政治的困扰。
一种看法认为(综合了各种不同的观点论调)，对于金融的再监管应该限制金融所涉及的大小和范围。另一些人则提出，如果不进行系统性改革，即便缩小金融机构也无济于事，最后还是由纳税人来买单。不过，如果我们不能真正理解系统风险的内涵，缩小规模的银行也会倒闭或是同时陷入萧条，从而影响到实体经济的发展。
另一个流行观点指出，限制银行规模也同时限制其效益。这就引发了第三种论调：大型机构利用自身资源过度影响政治，“腐化”监管者。更直接说，大型机构会想方设法获取自己想要的那种监管体系——使其迎合一种违反对冲要求的高利润超级结构，获取短期利润最大化。
第二种方法针对是限制杠杆效应。因为高杠杆意味着高风险——导致各种资产价格高度关联，一旦恶化，则会迅速蔓延开来。杠杆也是导致风险误判和价格错位的部分原因。限制杠杆虽有必要，但这也增加了资本利用和投资的成本。
再者，一般都认为，由于系统复杂性，信息知识和经验的不对称性会成倍增加。这种不对称性阻碍市场的发展，在此环境下的利益冲突也变得尤其危险。
尽可能地信息披露是防止利益冲突的一种方法。或是通过加强监管来限制利益冲突。例如，资产管理，配置，承销和证券化和自营业务应该被严格区分开，这能防范由于混业经营而导致不同的风险相互叠加，因为不同的业务对资本金的要求不同。
还有另外两种方法来解决复杂性性和不对称性。一种被广泛运用于发展中国家，即对产品本身进行限制(例如，针对衍生产品和对冲基金)，他们认为对风险的防范要远大于产品带来的好处，只有控制资本的流入才能限制其风险扩散。另一种则是减少信息的不对称性，或是对参与者的资质进行评级(在本次危机中，这种做法有着巨大漏洞。)
更为深度层次而言，有关危机的探讨有着两种对立的观点。一种是“完美风暴”说：虽然存在着许多的失误，概念曲解和信息不对称等种种复杂性，加上各种令人厌恶的行为，但在市场参与者，监管者或学者共同的努力下，系统几乎不会崩盘。反对者认为，有经验的业者知道系统风险，但他们却为了超额利润而甘于冒险。
现在普遍(隐含的)看法是，政府应该建立金融系统的架构和规则，这种框架将涵盖所有参与者的利益。如果体系完善，系统就运行良好。法律规则可以确保系统稳定，有效和公平。
但由于系统自身的复杂性，经验，洞察力和实时信息不可能集中在一个地方，政府和监管者也不可能完全掌握，依赖如此的框架就显得不可靠和不明智。再者，它忽视了信任的重要性。以我之见，应该从维持系统稳定和权益的一个共同责任概念入手，即由参与者和监管者共同负责制。
令人吃惊的是，没有一个高管详述他的公司如何追求行业的稳定性。目前，公众的愤怒在于，这些机构影响了法律和行业道德规范的制定，本应对系统的稳定性作出更多的贡献。
金融业，监管者和政治领袖们需要共同对此体系和整个经济负责。这种价值应该牢牢地灌输行业中——职业操守应比规则更为严格。它将超越险隘的私利或是利用信息来谋利行为。这将成为从业者日常的指导准则，道德约束补充。
某些人会反对这种想法，认为不可能起作用，因为违反了贪婪的人性。然而，这种价值观对其他职业有着作用。例如医学，就经验和信息而言，医生和患者之间就存在着巨大的不对等性。滥用这种不对称的后果影响巨大。这就需要对医生行持续不断地职业操守教育和同行之间相互监督。
就此而言，如此价值观的转变和自身扮演角色重新定义当然不会解决系统风险的问题。更不会改变规则。然而，严格来说，这有助于引起人们关注金融对经济的影响。甚至有助于信任的重建。
(本文作者系2001年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，斯坦福大学名誉教授，美国发展委员会主席。)
In Finance We Distrust
Around the world, the debate about financial regulation is coming to a head. A host of arguments and proposals is in play, often competing with one another – and thus inciting public and political confusion.
One approach to financial re-regulation – supported by arguments of varying persuasiveness – is to limit the size and scope of financial institutions. Some claim that smaller entities can fail without impairing the system, thus sparing taxpayers the cost of a bailout. But if systemic risk emerges in ways that are not yet fully understood, smaller banks may all fail or become distressed simultaneously, damaging the real economy.
A second, hotly debated argument is that limiting banks’ size and scope has relatively low costs in terms of performance. This point is used to bolster a third argument: large institutions have undue political influence and thus “capture” their regulators. Put bluntly, large and profitable financial institutions will find a way to get the regulatory system they want – one that is compatible with a highly profitable trading super-structure that goes beyond the requirements of hedging and seeks to maximize short-term gains。
A second approach, on which there is substantial agreement in principle, is to limit leverage. The main argument is that high leverage contributes powerfully to systemic risk – a condition in which asset prices move in a highly correlated way, and distress, when it occurs, spreads quickly. Leverage is also partially caused by misperceptions of risk and mispricing of liquidity. It is desirable to constrain leverage, but not to the point of increasing the cost of capital and investment。
Moreover, few would disagree that, as the complexity of the system increases, gaps and asymmetries in terms of information, knowledge, and expertise are multiplying. Such asymmetries impair market performance in a variety of ways, and conflicts of interest are particularly dangerous in such an environment because they create an incentive to exploit precisely these advantages.
Rigorous disclosure requirements that include conflicts of interest are one way to limit the potential damage. Or the conflicts can be limited by regulating the scope of financial institutions. For example, asset management, distribution, underwriting and securitization, and proprietary trading would be separated in various ways. This approach has the added advantage of preventing different risk profiles and their appropriate capital requirements from getting mixed up in the same entity and balance sheet。
There are two other ways to address complexity and asymmetries. One, widely adopted in developing countries, is simply to impose restrictions on products (for example, derivatives and hedge funds) on the grounds that the upside in terms of risk avoidance far outweigh the costs – less access to capital and reduced risk spreading. The other way is to try to reduce the informational gaps or their impact by regulating the expertise and incentives surrounding the rating process (the failure of which had serious consequences in the current crisis)。
At a somewhat deeper level, there are two conflicting threads running through the public debate surrounding the crisis. One is the “perfect storm” position: there were very many failures, misperceptions, informational asymmetries, and complexities, as well as much repugnant behavior, but it never occurred to market participants, regulators, or academics that the aggregate effect would be a near-collapse of the system. Critics of that argument maintain that sophisticated players understood the systemic risks, didn’t care, and cynically played the game that they helped to create – in some cases for enormous profit。
It now seems universally accepted (often implicitly) that government should establish the structure and rules for the financial system, with participants then pursuing their self-interest within that framework. If the framework is right, the system will perform well. The rules bear the burden of ensuring the collective social interest in the system’s stability, efficiency, and fairness。
But in a complex system in which expertise, insight, and real-time information are not concentrated in one place, and certainly not in government and regulatory circles, reliance on such a framework seems deficient and unwise. Moreover, it ignores the importance of trust. A better starting point, I believe, is the notion of shared responsibility for the stability of the system and its social benefits – shared, that is, by participants and regulators。
It is striking that no senior executive of whom I am aware has laid out in any detail how his or her institution’s expertise could be deployed in pursuit of the collective goal of stability. The suspicion that underlies much of today’s public anger is that these institutions, having influenced the formulation of the legal and ethical rules, could do more to contribute to stability than just obey them。
The finance industry, regulators, and political leaders need to create a shared sense of collective responsibility for the system as a whole and its impact on the rest of the economy. This set of values should be deeply embedded in the industry – and thus should transcend haggling over regulation. It should take precedence over narrow self-interest or the potential profit opportunities associated with exploiting an informational advantage. And it should be thought of as an addition to the guiding norms, rules, and ethics associated with “normal” times。
Some will object that this idea won’t work because it runs counter to greedy human nature. Yet such values shape other professions. In medicine, there is a huge and unbridgeable gap in expertise and information between doctors and patients. The potential for abuse is enormous. It is limited by professional values that are inculcated throughout doctors’ training, and which are bolstered by a quiet form of peer review。
By itself, such a shift in values and the implicit model that defines roles certainly will not solve the challenge of systemic risk. Neither will fiddling with the rules. Taken seriously, however, it could help provide an ongoing reminder of the importance of the financial sector to the broader well-being of the economy. It might even help start rebuilding trust。
(本文作者介绍：2001年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者美国斯坦福大学商学院研究生院前任院长和现任名誉院长，纽约大学斯特恩商学院经济学教授，增长与发展委员会主席。著有《下一次趋同》一书。)
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