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人民币浮动还是不浮动，这是一个问题。更精确地说，这是其中一个问题。中国政府也可以将人民币与美元在更高的水平挂钩。最近对中国的访问使我相信，中国领导人在近期无意改变他们视为成功的机制。但是，该机制也不会永远不变。什么时候会变？又怎么样变呢？
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To
float or not to float, that is the question. To be more precise, it is one
of the questions. The Chinese authorities could also repeg the renminbi at
a higher rate. My recent visit has convinced me that the leadership will
not change what they see as a successful regime in the near future. But it
will also not last forever. When and how might it change?
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自从中国似乎有意无限制地累积外汇储备以来，中国的贸易伙伴能够影响中国的手段便是有限的。这是中国要按照自己的条件进行的决策。然而，起点必须是，判断中国的货币是不是低估。许多美国人以美国对中国庞大且日益增加的双边贸易赤字为由，自然而然得出肯定的答案。但是，这不能说明什么问题。重要的是要看总体收支平衡状况。
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Since
the Chinese seem willing to accumulate foreign currency reserves without
limit, the leverage of its partners is limited. This is a decision China
will make, on its own terms. Nevertheless, the starting point must be
whether the currency is undervalued. Many Americans assume it is, pointing
to their country's vast, and growing, bilateral trade deficits. But these
tell us nothing. What matters is the overall balance of payments.
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在过去7年中，中国每年的经常帐户盈余为100亿至400亿美元。国际货币基金组织预测，今年的盈余为250亿美元，比国内生产总值的2％略低*。但是中国也经历着巨额外国直接投资净流入。如果把两方面汇总，今年的盈余将不低于国内生产总值的5％。
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Over
the past seven years, China has been running current account surpluses of
about bn to bn a year (see chart). The International Monetary Fund
forecasts the surplus this year at bn, a little under 2 per cent of
gross domestic product.* But China also has a huge net inflow of foreign
direct investment. If one takes the sum of these two elements, the surplus
this year will be a good 5 per cent of GDP.
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但是，在2001年之前，中国的资本帐户各项保持进出平衡。因此，总体来看，中国没有积累很大的外汇储备。但是，现在情况已经改变。平衡的资本流出，已经变为巨额资本流入。从2000年底至2003年9月，外汇储备增加2180亿美元。
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Until
2001, however, China also had a balancing outflow in the rest of its
capital account. Overall, therefore, the country did not accumulate
substantial foreign currency reserves. But this has changed. The balancing
capital outflow has become a huge inflow. Between the end of 2000 and
September 2003, foreign currency reserves rose by bn.
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在2001年之前，经常帐户盈余和外国直接投资至少被其他资本流出所抵消。人民币没有被低估。自从那时以来，人民币面临很强的升值压力，当然大部分可能具有投机性。总体而言，国际货币基金组织董事会得出结论：“没有任何明确的证据显示，眼下人民币是被大幅低估了。”
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At
least until 2001, surpluses on the current account and FDI were offset by
other capital outflows. The currency was not undervalued. Strong upward
pressure has emerged since then, but much of this may be speculative. On
balance, the IMF's board of directors has concluded "that there is no
clear evidence that the renminbi is substantially undervalued".
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然而，通过逆推的方法，肯定可以获得两个结果。第一，全球收支现在严重失衡，美国经常帐户赤字被其他国家的盈余抵消。人民币实际升值必然是全球调整的要素。第二，以美元计价的中国出口产品价格正在降低。如果其他许多国家货币对美元升值（人民币也不例外），用人民币计价的大多数制造业产品的价格也将下降。这将会支持中国正在出口通货紧缩的指控。相反，如果中国出口产品的美元价格上升，将更为理想。
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Nevertheless,
two offsetting points must be made. The first is that global payments are
significantly out of balance, with a huge US current account deficit
offset by surpluses elsewhere. A real appreciation of the renminbi must be
a necessary element in global adjustment. The second point is that the
prices of China's exports are falling, in dollars. If many of the world's
currencies appreciate against the dollar (and so also the renminbi),
prices of a wide range of manufactures must fall in their domestic
currencies. That would strengthen the charge that China is exporting
deflation. It would be better if, instead, the dollar prices of China's
exports were rising.
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我的结论是，要求中国实际汇率升值，从全球的视野来看，是有道理的。但是，就中国人的观点来说，情况完全不同。中国的观点是，人民币盯住美元有许多有利之处：可以保持出口和香港市场的稳定。香港的货币也与美元挂钩；并且在此框架内经济运作一向很好。
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My
conclusion is that the case for an appreciation of the Chinese real
exchange rate has merit, from a global perspective. But the argument looks
very different to the Chinese themselves. For them, the dollar peg has
many advantages: it provides stability for both exporters and Hong Kong,
whose currency is also pegged to the dollar; and it has given a framework
in which the economy has performed excellently.
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更重要的是，允许人民币升值会产生诸多不利影响。升值代表着对美国政府和投机者压力的屈服；在中国这个通货膨胀本来就已经很低的国家，升值将降低贸易商品的国内价格，对农民的打击尤其严重；升值也可能暴露中国公司资产负债表存在很大问题。
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More
important, the disadvantages of allowing the currency to appreciate are
significant. It would represent a concession to pressure from the US
authorities and speculators; it would lower domestic prices of tradeable
goods in a country that already has very low inflation, with particularly
severe effects on farmers; and it might reveal substantial weaknesses in
the balance sheets of Chinese businesses.
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也很难说什么是可供选择的正确机制。如果将人民币在较高水平盯住美元，投资者很可能再次发起攻击。如果将人民币浮动，有可能调整过头。在存在外汇管制的情况下，公司也将难以回避外汇风险。而解除外汇管制将使面临倒闭和管理不善的金融机构受全球资本市场的左右。
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It
is also unclear what the right alternative regime would be. If the
currency were repegged at a higher rate, speculators might well try again.
If it were floated, it might overshoot. In the presence of exchange
controls, it would also be difficult for companies to hedge foreign
currency risk. But lifting exchange controls would expose bankrupt and
ill-managed financial institutions to the temptations of the global
capital markets.
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所有这些都是不考虑变更政策的令人信服的原因。但是，变更也是有理由的：当前外汇储备的累积对货币供应造成严重后果。今年货币和信贷发行的增加大大超过名义国内生产总值的增长。这意味着现在的过度投资，将成为未来更多的不良贷款。但在目前，对此表示担忧的观点并不占多数。部分原因是，当局相信，信贷增长正在得到控制。再者，政府倾向于高增长率。还有就是中国眼下不存在通胀。较高的通货膨胀甚至有助于降低金融系统的大规模坏帐。
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All
these seem cogent reasons not to consider changing policy. But there is
also a reason to do so: the monetary consequences of current reserve
accumulation. Money and credit have been growing far faster than nominal
GDP this year. That means excessive investment now and still more
non-performing loans in the years to come. Yet even this is not an
overwhelming worry, at present. That is partly because the authorities
believe they are bringing credit growth under control, partly because the
government welcomes the high growth and partly because inflation is
non-existent. Somewhat higher inflation could even be a helpful way to
lower the mountain of bad debt in the financial system.
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结论是，中国当局将不会很快改变政策。相反，短期的目标将是减压。这些政策可以而且的确已经产生效果。包括进一步放松资本流出和进口限制，以及到国外进行采购的特别计划。所有这些都有实际意义。
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The
conclusion is that the authorities will not change policy soon. In the
short term, the aim, instead, will be to lower the pressure. Policies can
- indeed, already do - include further liberalisation of capital outflow
and imports, along with special programmes to buy goods abroad. All this
makes practical sense.
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从中期来看，最好也是最有可能采取的政策是过渡到严格管理的浮动，而不是对盯住汇率向上进行调整。这样的浮动甚至与外汇管制没有矛盾，正如印度的例子所表明的那样。可以通过扩大浮动区间或过渡到盯住不规定币种的一揽子货币来实现浮动。这种制度的重要特征是更大的汇率不确定性。当局随时可以推高美元对人民币汇率，从而增加不确定性。
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In
the medium term, the best and most likely policy would be a move to a
heavily managed float, rather than an upward adjustment of the peg. Such a
float is even compatible with exchange controls, as the Indian example has
shown. The float can be achieved by widening the bands or moving to an
unspecified currency basket. The important feature of such a system would
be greater exchange rate uncertainty. The authorities could increase that
uncertainty by driving the dollar back up against the renminbi from time
to time.
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但是，中国的长期目标是完全取消汇率控制，使人民币成为自由浮动的货币，和建立一个实行通货膨胀目标制的中央银行。但是，这也要求一个有效并监管制度完善的金融体系。现实的猜测是，要实现这个目标，至少要到下个十年的开始甚至更晚的时间。
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In
the long term, however, China will want full liberalisation of exchange
controls, a freely floating currency and an inflation-targeting central
bank. But this would also require an efficient and well-regulated
financial system. A good guess is that this will not happen before the
beginning of the next decade, or even later.
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管理由目前的人民币向未来世界货币的转化，是一个富有极大挑战性的任务。在眼下不可能发生重大的政策变革。目前中国当局应当积极地采取措施，放松进口和资本流动限制，同时在不久的将来，过渡到更灵活的汇率制度。中国跳出单纯累积外汇储备的圈子越早，对中国本身和对国际收支体系来说，也将越好。*国际货币基金组织结束与中华人民共和国的2003
年第四条磋商，2003年11月18日，见www.imf.org
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Managing
the transition of the renminbi to its prospective role as a world currency
is a huge challenge. Large changes in policy cannot be expected right now.
But the Chinese authorities should be liberalising imports and capital
outflow aggressively, while moving, in the reasonably near future, to a
more flexible exchange rate. The sooner the Chinese escape from their
reserve-accumulation treadmill, the better off both they - and the world
payments system - will be. * IMF Concludes 2003 Article IV Consultation
with the People's Republic of China, November 18 2003, www.imf.org. xref
martin.wolf@ft.com
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martin.wolf@ft.com
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译者/秋实
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