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上月，在迈阿密举行的美洲自由贸易区(FTAA)部长级会议上，罗伯特•策利克(Robert
Zoellick)极力主张的特惠贸易协定遭遇严重挫折。
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Robert
Zoellick's love affair with preferential trade deals suffered a serious
setback at last month's ministerial meeting on the Free Trade Area of the
Americas in Miami.
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迈阿密会议上拼凑而成的协议，不过是顾全各国颜面的方案罢了。尽管前天美国宣布与四个中美洲国家达成贸易协定，但是，美国贸易代表寻求双边及地区协定的策略，显然仍面临严重的障碍。
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The
patchwork deal that emerged from Miami was little more than a face-saving
formula. Notwithstanding announcement of trade agreements between the US
and four Central American nations the day before yesterday, it is clear
that the US trade representative's strategy of going for bilateral and
regional deals faces serious difficulties.
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因此，尽管在9月份世界贸易组织坎昆会议上，有一些关于多哈回合谈判终结的不成熟传言，但该谈判现已重新浮出水面，成为推进国际贸易的重大选择。在世界贸易体系中，农业是保护主义最根深蒂固的行业。我们认为，如果我们打算在农业贸易自由化上取得更多进步，那么多哈谈判不仅是一种选择，而且必须是唯一的选择。在本周召开的世贸组织总理事会会议上，各国纷纷表示，将对多哈回合谈判提供压倒一切的政治支持。而更重要的是，这种政治支持应尽快化为各国之间具体的谈判。
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The
consequence is that the Doha round has resurfaced as a serious option for
advancing world trade, despite the premature reports of its demise at the
Canc鷑 meeting of the World Trade Organisation in September. We would
argue that Doha must be seen not just as an option but as the only option
if we are to make further progress in liberalising that part of the world
trading systemswheresprotectionism is most entrenched: agriculture. That
makes it all the more important that the overwhelming political support
for the Doha round, expressed at the WTO's general council meeting this
week, is translated quicklysintosmeaningful negotiations.
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迈阿密会谈之所以失败，部分原因在于贸易伙伴的选择、双边和地区谈判的议程受到了政治干预。对此，策利克先生始终拒绝承认，哪怕美国已经利用双边协定来惠顾其忠诚的盟国（如澳大利亚），同时惩罚其薄情的朋友（如新西兰）。事实上，国内与国际政治已成为贸易自由化的绊脚石。
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Part
of the reason for the failure of the Miami talks was that politics
intrudessintosthe choice of trade partners and the agendas covered by
bilaterals and regionals. Mr Zoellick has always refused to admit this,
even as the US has used bilateral deals to favour loyal allies (such as
Australia) and punish fickle friends (such as New Zealand). The reality is
that domestic and international politics create roadblocks to trade
liberalisation.
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在美国与墨西哥就北美贸易自由协定(NAFTA)展开谈判期间，这一点就就已昭然若著了。许多贸易保护主义者都将矛头指向墨西哥的问题，而不管这些问题是否与贸易有任何关联。他们声称，与墨西哥进行的自由贸易不会是“公平”贸易。同时，各种非贸易问题也摆上了谈判桌，包括墨西哥的环境状况、劳工标准、知识产权法，及其民主情况。最终，北美自由贸易协定勉强得以幸存，而且自那以后，贸易谈判都受到美国游说团体的控制。这些人不论好坏，都打着“贸易”的幌子试图推进议程。
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That
was clear during the US negotiations with Mexico over the North American
Free Trade Agreement. Many protectionists focused on Mexico's problems,
regardless of whether these had anything to do with trade. They alleged
that free trade with Mexico would not be "fair" trade. A variety
of non-trade issues became part of the talks: the state of Mexico's
environment, its labour standards, its intellectual property law and the
state of its democracy. In the end Nafta survived, but barely, and trade
negotiations since then have been taken prisoner by US lobbies, good and
bad, that seek to advance their agendas by pretending that they are
"trade-related".
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但美洲自由贸易区遭受的是国际政治之苦。显然，巴西将美洲自由贸易区视为北美自由贸易协定的延伸，美国仍在其中扮演霸主角色。而巴西倾向于扩展南方共同市场(Mercosur)关税同盟，因为它在该同盟中占主导地位。在迈阿密会议上，这种政治议程导致巴西与美国及其盟友加拿大和墨西哥相对峙。也许巴西总统卢拉•达席尔瓦(Luiz
In醕io Lula da Silva)及其顾问是在对策利克先生2002年的一番话进行报复。当时策利克说，如果达席尔瓦总统反对美洲自由贸易区，他完全可以与南极洲进行贸易。
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But
the FTAA has been afflicted instead by international politics. Brazil
evidently sees it as an extension of Nafta, with the US playing the
hegemon. Brazil favours instead an expansion from the Mercosur customs
union, which it dominates. At Miami, this political agenda set Brazil
against the US and its allies, Canada and Mexico. Perhaps Luiz In醕io
Lula da Silva and his advisers were getting their own back on Mr Zoellick
for his remark in 2002 that, if he was opposed to the FTAA, the Brazilian
president was free to trade with Antarctica.
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但双边协议和区域协议的主要问题是，它们完全无法处理取消农业补贴的问题。美国和欧洲都普遍对农业进行补贴，在这种情况下，怎能优先削减农业生产补贴呢？不可能。同时，一国为其自由贸易合作伙伴优先削减出口补贴，这种做法虽然在技术上可行，但在政治上却行不通。为什么？因为此举会颠覆特惠贸易协议的政治逻辑。降低自由贸易协定成员国的关税将削弱非成员国的竞争力，因为非成员国向自由贸易协定国市场出口产品时，仍将面临关税。这为签署自由贸易协定提供了强大动力。但若自由贸易协定成员国削减其出口补贴，那么，非成员国由于维持补贴，在自由贸易协定国市场的竞争力反而会增强。
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But
the main problem with bilateral and regional deals is that they simply
cannot deal with the issue of removing agricultural subsidies. How can
production subsidies, which have proliferated in the US and Europe, be cut
preferentially? It is impossible. At the same time, cutting export
subsidies preferentially for one's free trade association partners, though
technically possible, is out of the question politically. Why? Because
such a move would turn the political logic of preferential trade deals on
its head. Reducing tariffs for members of an FTA lowers the
competitiveness of non-members, which continue to face tariffs when they
sellsintosFTA markets. That provides a strong incentive to sign FTAs. But
if FTA members cut their export subsidies, the competitiveness of
non-members, which maintain their subsidies, increases instead in FTA
markets.
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具有讽刺意味的是，即使是在世贸组织规则(允许在特定条件下签署自由贸易协定)的宽松规定之下，美国自己长期以来也一直采取这样的立场，即自由贸易协定成员国不得将农业等大型部门排除在协定范围之外。由于存在上文中概述的困难，保护性农业补贴很可能不受自由贸易协定的束缚。因此，若美国寻求签署自由贸易协定，就与其所持立场的精神并不完全相符。
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Ironically,
even under the lax discipline of WTO rules - which allow FTAs under
specific conditions - the US itself has long taken the position that FTA
members should not be allowed to exempt large sectors, such as
agriculture, from their ambit. To pursue FTAs - which, owing to the
difficulties outlined above, are likely to exempt protectionist
agricultural subsidies - is not exactly consistent with the spirit of that
position.
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如果全世界的贸易国要反对农业补贴，那么走双边之路不仅不明智，而且不现实。多哈回合谈判才是必经之路。
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If
the world's trading nations are to attack agricultural subsidies, going
down the bilateral path is not merely unwise; it is also impractical.
There is no escaping Doha.
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加迪什•巴格瓦蒂是哥伦比亚大学教授及美国对外关系委员会高级研究员。罗伯特•鲍德温是威斯康星大学经济学名誉教授。
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Jagdish
Bhagwati is university professor at Columbia University and senior fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations. Robert Baldwin is emeritus professor
of economics at the University of Wisconsin.
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译者/江洁
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