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俄罗斯的商界巨头先是专心敛聚大笔财富，然后自吹自擂，但后来担心在弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir
Putin)总统对他们政治上打压，所以又试图淡化自己的财富。现在世界银行(World
Bank)对此作了一次重要尝试，算一算俄国商界巨头对国家经济的控制究竟有多大。
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Russia's
business tycoons first concentrated on accumulating their vast
wealth, then boasted about it, and have since tried to downplay it
as they fear a political clampdown against them under President
Vladimir Putin. Now the World Bank has made an important stab at
calculating just how significant their grip on the national
economy really is.
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在本周发表的一份史无前例的报告中，世界银行驻莫斯科代表处协同一个俄罗斯及国外经济学家小组，对此作了估算。结果显示，以销售额衡量，仅23名个人或集团就控制了俄罗斯三分之一以上的工业，他们还控制着16%的就业，并掌握所有银行业资产的17%。
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In
a ground-breaking report published this week, the Bank's Moscow
office, in association with a team of Russian and foreign
economists, estimates that just 23 individuals or groups control
more than a third of the country's industry as measured by sales,
and 16 per cent of employment. They also hold 17 per cent of all
banking assets.
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排名表上的名字并不令人十分吃惊。他们大多是有政治影响力的寡头及他们的商界伙伴，过去几年中，他们已经声名显赫。其中多数人在以前的评估中已得到确认，如《福布斯》(Forbes)杂志的全球富人榜。
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There
are no big surprises in the names that dominate the list [see
table 1]. They mostly correspond to those politically influential
oligarchs and their business partners whose identities have become
well known over the past few years. Most of the individuals have
been identified by previous estimates, such as Forbes magazine's
list of the world's richest.
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但引人注目的是，该报告证实，几大公司经营者的重要性，
与其说是体现在不多的几个上市集团内，倒不如说是体现在在更广泛的俄罗斯经济背景中。世界银行研究人员首次尝试在公开信息以外深入挖掘，对全俄42个产业部门的1300多家公司的样本进行研究。
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But
what is striking is that it confirms the weight of a few corporate
operators when seen in the context of the broader Russian economy,
rather than simply in a handful of quoted groups. For the first
time, the World Bank's researchers attempted to dig well beyond
public information, studying a sample of more than 1,300 companies
in 42 sectors across the country.
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上世纪90年代中期，
俄国出现了一场颇有争议的销价内部“债转股”私有化运动，而该私有化运动的受益者在排名中明显靠前。但也有些出人意料的竞争者名列前茅，对了解十几名之后的那些入选人士，该报告也有可圈可点的洞见。
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Those
who benefited from the controversial cut-price, insider
"loans for shares" privatisations of the mid-1990s are
all well represented. But there are also some unexpected
contenders high in the rankings, and intriguing insights into the
next group of people below the first dozen.
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例如，伊力姆浆纸(Ilim
Pulp)的控制者排名居前，表明俄罗斯巨大的原材料财富的重要地位，甚至超过了更出名的石油和天然气行业。这有助于解释，为什么该公司已成为奥列格•德里帕斯卡(Oleg
Deripaska)来势汹汹的恶意收购对象。这位寡头最初是在铝业成名的。
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Those
controlling Ilim Pulp, for example, come high on the list,
illustrating the significance of Russia's vast raw materials
wealth even beyond the better known oil and gas sectors. That
helps explain why it has been the subject of such heated hostile
takeover attention by Oleg Deripaska, the oligarch who first made
his name in aluminium.
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不同行业所有权的集中程度相差甚远。若说黑色和有色金属、矿砂、铝、石油和交通行业均由寡头集团高度支配，那么其他行业则掌握在不同人的手中：例如建筑、木材、谷类加工、家具和烘焙行业。
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Concentration
of ownership varies widely between sectors. If ferrous and
non-ferrous metals, ore, aluminium, oil and vehicle sectors are
all heavily dominated by the oligarchic groups, others remain in
different hands: in construction, timber, milling, furniture and
baking, for example.
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但数据也显示，即使在寡头控制的公司里也的确有少数股股东，但他们始终只是少数股股东。高度集中的控制权依然是主导模式，在俄罗斯，分散所有权的文化看来还很遥远。
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But
the data also show that while minority shareholders do exist even
in oligarch-controlled companies, they remain precisely that.
Firmly concentrated control remains the dominant model, and a
culture of dispersed ownership still seems a long way off in
Russia.
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寡头平均持有各自公司近80%的股份，这种支配程度比其他类型公司的所有者都高。但在公共部门、外商和其他私人所有者控制的企业中，主导股东的持股比例也还在70%以上。
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Oligarchs
on average hold nearly 80 per cent of the shares in their
companies, a greater degree of dominance than for companies
controlled by other types of owner. But the proportion in the
dominant shareholder's hands remains above 70 per cent for
businesses controlled by the public sector, by foreigners and by
other private owners alike.
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很难把这些数据放到国际环境中去衡量，因为在其他地方几乎没有做过如此规模的比较研究。但在俄罗斯这个15年前抛弃了国有计划经济的国家，已出现一个重要的准绳：除了一些私有业主外，国家仍是商业领域极重要的控制者。
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It
is difficult to put these figures into international context,
since few comparative studies on such a scale have taken place
elsewhere. But one important yardstick that emerges from a country
that turned its back on state planning 15 years ago is that
alongside a few private owners, the Russian state remains a highly
significant controller of business.
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该准绳适用于联邦政府，它控制着另外20%的工业销售额，以及8%的就业。该准绳也适用于一些地区，特别是鞑靼斯坦和巴什阔尔托斯坦，这两个少数民族共和国拒绝上世纪90年代发起的全国规模的私有化运动。这两个地区政府各自占有另外5%的销售和3%的就业。
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That
applies to the federal government, which accounts for a further 20
per cent of total industrial sales and 8 per cent of employment.
It also applies to some regions, notably Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan, ethnic republics that refused the privatisations
launched nationally during the 1990s. Regional governments
collectively account for a further 5 and 3 per cent of sales and
jobs respectively.
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最有争议的是，该研究试图估算集中所有权的经济价值。公众对寡头的理解是，他们以太低的价格不公平地攫取了资产控制权，但许多分析师声称，他们至少是抵制政府、推行重组的必要力量，结果创造出一个更有竞争力的私人部门。
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Most
controversially, the study attempts to assess the economic value
of concentrated ownership. While the public perception of
oligarchs is that they unfairly seized control of assets too
cheaply, many analysts have argued that they at least provided a
necessary force to resist the state and to push through
restructuring, creating a more competitive private sector as a
result.
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世界银行的研究结论称，根据销售额、利润和生产率计算，寡头控制的公司比那些联邦或地区政府控制的公司管理得更好。
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The
World Bank study concludes that companies controlled by oligarchs
are better managed than those held by federal and regional
governments, as measured by sales, profits and productivity.
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但没有证据表明，寡头的表现明显优于其他经济部门，而且该研究归结说，与规模更小且更有活力的私人所有者相比，寡头管理者实际上效率更低。
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But
there is no evidence that oligarchs significantly outperform the
rest of the economy, and the study concludes that they are in fact
less efficient managers of assets than smaller, more dynamic
private owners.
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寡头集团主导了投资流动，它们的投资比私人所有者的投资高出30%。但主要原因，它们恰恰控制了产生大量现金的高利润率出口销售业，而较少投资于他们进行多元化投资的其他行业。寡头并不总像人们认为的那样有影响力。在分析本地权势企业（那些获得过多特殊税收优惠、市场特权和财政援助计划的公司）的“地区掌控”程度时，寡头的排名整体上落后于地区和联邦政府拥有的企业。而参与“债转股”私有化的少数寡头被证明是所有人中最有效率的政治说客。
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Oligarchic
groups dominate investment flows, investing 30 per cent more than
other private owners. But that is largely because they control
precisely those sectors that provide large quantities of cash from
high-margin export sales, while investing less in the other
sectors into which they have diversified. d4 The oligarchs are not
always as influential as they are made out to be. In analysing the
extent of "regional capture" of local authorities -
those companies that have secured disproportionate special tax
concessions, market privileges and financial aid packages - they
rank collectively behind businesses owned by regional and federal
authorities and foreign investors. However, the smaller number of
oligarchs involved in "loans for shares" privatisations
prove the most effective lobbyists of all.
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这些数据仍有不完善之处。要收集到具体的所有权信息是不可能的，因为多数俄罗斯公司的控制权都掩藏在模糊的公司架构之下，而且通常由海外信托机构控制。这些数据来自金融分析师、记者和银行业人士所作的评估，依据的是他们对俄罗斯公司控制状况的了解。
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There
are still imperfections in the data. It is impossible to gather
detailed ownership information, since control of most Russian
companies is hidden behind obscure corporate structures, often
through offshore trusts. The figures derive from assessments made
by financial analysts, journalists and bankers, based on their
perceptions of control.
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要准确估算寡头的真实财富也是不可能的。有关寡头所控公司的利润数据也很难获得，更别说公司估价了。哪怕是上市公司和经审计的公司，分析师也常对它们的全面财务信息的披露状况提出疑问。许多寡头的权益都在私有企业，而这些企业不受外部审查的约束。
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Nor
is it possible to estimate accurately the oligarchs' true wealth.
Information on the profits, let alone valuations, of the companies
they hold is difficult to obtain. Analysts often raise questions
about the full financial disclosure even of those businesses that
are quoted and audited. Many of the oligarchs' interests are in
private companies subject to no external scrutiny.
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最后，在这样一个收购及出售企业盛行的时期，很难评估寡头所有权真正的长期影响，也很难评估他们收购业绩最差企业的程度、以及是否仍在设法扭转它们的局面。要想对此评估，则需要后续调查。
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Finally,
at a time of significant acquisition and sales of businesses, it
is difficult to assess the true long-term impact of oligarch
ownership, and how far they may have acquired the worst-performing
companies, and still be working on turning them round. That will
require follow-up surveys.
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然而，总体而言，该研究清晰表明了一个重要的政策结论。那就是，如果说，过去数年中，所有权集中可能已帮助推行了一些必要的重组，或者因当时其他经济问题需要优先解决，所有权集中至少是个值得政府宽忍的障碍的话，那么现在对约束寡头作用的时候了。
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Overall,
however, the study points clearly to an important policy
conclusion. If ownership concentration may have helped push
through some necessary restructuring over the past few years, or
was at least a hindrance worth tolerating by the state at a time
when other economic priorities dominated, it is now time to rein
in the role of the oligarchs.
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这份研究报告的作者表示，为了推动竞争，鼓励小企业发展，有必要实施反垄断政策以分拆大型集团企业，并采取其他措施。这类举措与美国在19世纪末为遏制所谓“强盗大亨”影响力采用的方式是相似的。
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Antitrust
policy to break up conglomerates and other measures to enhance
competition and encourage the development of small businesses is
essential, the authors argue. Such a move would mirror the way
that the US curbed the influence of the so-called "robber
barons" at the end of the 19th century.
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要做到这一点，普京先生的新政府必须有能力建立一个更公正、更严格的监管体系，和一个完全独立的司法体系，而不是发动一场带有政治动机的捕风捉影运动，来对付其选择的目标。
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That
requires an ability by Mr Putin's new administration to build a
fairer, tougher regulatory system and a genuinely independent
judiciary, rather to launch politically motivated witch-hunts
against selected targets.
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但是，如果今日的寡头想在俄罗斯社会中展开越来越多的慈善活动，以此与当年的卡内基和洛克菲勒财团相媲美，那他们也必须为了整个国家商业领域更广泛的经济利益着想，而接受对自身活动产生的负面影响。
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But
if today's oligarchs want to compare themselves to the latter-day
Carnegies and Rockefellers through their growing philanthropic
activity in Russian society, they will also need to accept
negative consequences on their own activities for the broader
economic benefit of the country's business sector as a whole.
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译者/李裕
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