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七个“重要工业国”中的欧洲国家周末在伯卡莱顿(Boca
Raton)的会议上取得了胜利。但是只是纸上的胜利。一方面是因为G7的重要性正在下降，另一方面是G7成员国不愿意，或者说不能够采取必要的措施有所作为。会后发表的联合声明虽然声音洪亮，气势逼人，但作用甚微。
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The European members of thesgroupsof
seven "leading industrial countries" achieved a victory at the meeting in Boca
Raton over the weekend. But it was a victory on paper. This is partly because
the G7 is of declining significance and partly because its members are
unwilling, or unable, to take the steps needed to make a difference. The
communique is full of sound and fury, but signifies little. |
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联合声明似乎是有针对性的。声明宣称：“我们重申，汇率应当反应经济基本层面。汇率过于波动和无序变化对经济增长不利，……。在这种情况下，我们呼吁，本国货币汇率不具弹性的主要国家或经济体，应当按照市场机制，促进国际金融体系进行顺利深入的调整”。
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The document does appear to be
purposive: "We reaffirm," it declares, "that exchange rates should reflect
economic fundamentals. Excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange
rates are undesirable for economic growth. . . In this context, we emphasise
that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries or
economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote smooth and widespread
adjustments in the international financial system based on market mechanisms (my
emphasis)." |
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对于G7中来自欧元区的3个国家来说，这次声明的措辞纠正了去年十月迪拜会议后联合声明的错误。现在很清楚，这并不是针对欧元，而是针对缺乏“弹性”的货币，显然是指亚洲国家的货币(见图表)。G7一直在呼吁灵活汇率。但有哪个重要的国家予以理睬呢？回答几乎可以肯定是：没有。
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For the three members of the G7 from
the eurozone, this language rectifies the mistake made in the communique issued
after the meeting in Dubai last October. Now it is far clearer that the finger
points not at the euro, but at the currencies that lack "flexibility", notably
the Asian ones (see chart). The G7 has spoken up for flexible exchange rates all
round. But is anybody important listening? The answer, almost certainly, is: no.
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不难理解为什么欧洲人表现得如此不安。按照经合组织预测，虽然去年欧元区国内需求本身应当使GDP增长1.2％，但是由于欧元飚升，净贸易条件恶化，实现的经济增长只有0.5％。
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It is not hard to understand why the
Europeans should be so agitated. Last year, according to forecasts from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, eurozone domestic demand
would have expanded GDP by 1.2 per cent, on its own. But the deterioration in
net trade, as the euro soared, delivered economic growth of just 0.5 per cent.
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同样，欧洲国家也不难找到问题的根源。从2002年1月底美元开始迅速下跌，到去年10月为止，全球外汇储备增长8310亿美元。其中6110亿美元是由亚洲各经济体累积的，最多的是日本，为2190亿美元，然后是中国1840亿美元，台湾730亿美元(见图表)。在这21个月中，累积的全球外汇储备主要投资于美国政府债券，相当于美国以外国家GDP总额的2.25％，美国GDP的4.5％。相对于全世界的GDP来说，这肯定是有史以来最大的“援助”项目。这使美国同时拥有大炮和黄油，而无需在两者间进行选择。
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Nor is it hard for Europeans to
identify the culprits. Between the end of January 2002, when the dollar started
to fall briskly, and last October, global foreign currency reserves rose by
bn. Of this, bn was accumulated by Asian countries, with Japan's bn,
China's bn and Taiwan's bn in the lead (see chart). The global
accumulation of foreign currency reserves, predominantly invested in US official
obligations, was some 2?per cent of the rest of the world's GDP and 4?per cent
of US GDP over the 21 months in question. This must be the biggest "aid"
programme of all time, relative to global GDP. It has allowed the US to enjoy
both guns and butter, without needing to choose between the two. |
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由于全球汇率调整在亚洲受阻，全部压力落在了允许汇率自由浮动的货币肩上，包括欧元在内(见图表)。结果是，欧元区成员国受到疲软的国内需求和全球竞争力下降的“双重打击”。
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With the global currency adjustment
thwarted in Asia, it has fallen with full force on those currencies that are
allowed to float freely, including the euro (see chart). The eurozone member
countries have, as a result, been suffering from the "double whammy" of weak
domestic demand and falling global competitiveness. |
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为什么亚洲国家如此行事呢？去年9月份发表的一篇文章对此作出了最有启发性的诠释*。旧有的布雷顿森林固定汇率体系于1970年代初瓦解。可是，由于亚洲新兴市场经济体以及出于不同原因参与竞争的日本，试图保持具有竞争力的汇率，导致现在又出现了一个修订版的新制度，这便是澳大利亚经济学家马克斯•考登(Max
Corden)称为的“汇率保护主义”。正如国家经济研究局(NBER)论文所述的那样，亚洲国家选择了“与战后初期欧洲和日本同样的对外经济战略，低估本币，实行较大程度的外汇干预，对(资本帐户)进行控制，累积外汇储备，鼓励出口导向增长，将商品出口到有强大竞争力的发达国家。”
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Why are the Asians behaving in this
way? The most illuminating account was put forward in a paper published last
September.* The old Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system broke down in the
early 1970s. Today, however, a partial new system has emerged as Asian emerging
market economies and, for somewhat different reasons, Japan, attempt to preserve
competitive exchange rates. This is what the Australian economist Max Corden has
called "exchange rate protectionism". As the NBER paper puts it, Asian countries
have chosen "the same periphery strategy as immediate post-war Europe and Japan,
undervaluing the exchange rate, managing sizeable foreign exchange
interventions, imposing controls [on capital], accumulating reserves, and
encouraging export-led growth by sending goods to the competitive centre
countries." |
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我们暂且不论这是不是一种明智的策略。更为紧要的问题是，这种策略是否会并且什么时候会终止。部分的答案是，如果仅仅为了方便欧洲国家的话，没有理由期望这些国家中的任何一个改变它们的外汇政策。如果亚洲人(日本除外)和美国人就某些问题达成共识的话，那就是经济陈旧政策僵化的欧洲国家自作自收。他们觉得没有必要帮助那些自己不帮自己的人。
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Let us put to one side the question
of whether this is a sensible strategy. The more immediate one is whether and
when it might end. Part of the answer is that there can be no reason to expect
any of these countries to change their foreign exchange policies merely because
they inconvenience Europeans. If non-Japanese Asians and Americans agree on
anything it is that moaning Europeans are receiving precisely what their
decrepit economies and policy sclerosis deserve. They feel little need to help
those who do so little to help themselves. |
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亚洲国家只有在外汇储备累积对货币及信用增加、通货膨胀提高，以及坏帐风险加大产生不利影响时，才会改变政策。对日本来说，干预有利于帮助摆脱通货紧缩根源。在中国，去年12月时的年度消费物价仅上升3.2％。总体而言，中国压倒一切的目标仍然是经济增长，中国将拒绝任何威胁经济增长的政策改变。
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Asians will change their policies
only when the impact of reserve accumulation on the growth of money, credit,
inflation and the accumulation of bad debts risks becoming highly adverse. For
the Japanese, intervention helps lift the curse of deflation. For the Chinese,
consumer prices only rose by 3.2 per cent in the year to last December. Above
all, the overriding Chinese objective remains economic growth. Any policy change
likely to threaten that will be rejected. |
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如果美国愿意的话，将肯定有能力摧毁亚洲的盯住汇率制度，就像1971年保护主义的“尼克松冲击”一样。美国可以对亚洲向美国的出口实施贸易壁垒，或者干脆多印美元，用于购买亚洲货币。但是美国不大可能采取其中的任何做法。与中国保持良好的关系，现在对美国来说具有全球地缘政治的意义。而且，亚洲国家情愿抬高美元债券和美元本身的价格，满足了美国筹集庞大的政府和居民债务的需要。除非国内保护主义思潮变得十分强大，美国没有理由破坏亚洲重商主义者的汇率政策。
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The US could certainly destroy the
Asian exchange rate pegs if it wished to do so, as it did with the protectionist
"Nixon shock" in 1971. It could do so by imposing trade barriers against Asian
exports or by printing dollars, to purchase Asian currencies. But it is most
unlikely to do either of these things. Good relations with China are now of
geopolitical significance to the US. Moreover, the willingness of Asian
countries to keep both US bond prices and the dollar up helps finance the huge
borrowing of the US government and households. Unless domestic protectionist
sentiment becomes overwhelming, there is no reason for the Americans to attack
Asia's mercantilist foreign exchange policies. |
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最后，欧洲人可以通过参加干预主义者俱乐部实施自救。面临升值压力的货币当局总是可以通过开动印钞机来减压，但它们必须对失去对国内货币的控制做好准备。这不大可能是欧洲央行将会做的事情。欧洲央行能够(也应该)在这方面采取温和的举措，即降低利率。但是，因为对通货膨胀有不必要的担忧，欧洲央行甚至连这一步也不愿意走。
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Finally, the Europeans could help
themselves by joining the intervention club. The managers of a currency under
upward pressure can always drive it down, by printing money, but only if they
are also prepared to lose domestic monetary control in the process. That is
hardly what the European Central Bank is about to do. It could (and should) take
a modest step in this direction, by lowering its own interest rates. But, unduly
worried by inflation, it seems unwilling to do even that. |
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底线是简单明了的。欧洲国家可能既希望汇率更稳定，也希望其更有竞争力。但是在当今世界经济中起作用的是美国的双重赤字和亚洲的重商主义，这使欧洲人的愿望无法实现。除非采取目标明确的行动，否则联合公报的价值只有写在上边的那张纸那么高。
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The bottom line then is simple. The
Europeans may want both a more stable and more competitive exchange rate. But
the forces now at work in the world economy - the huge US twin deficits and
Asian mercantilism - make their wishes irrelevant. Unless backed by purposeful
action, communiques are barely worth the paper they are written on.
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*迈克尔•P.多利(Michael P.
Dooley)、大卫•富科茨-兰道(David Folkerts-Landau)和彼得•佳宝(Peter
Garber)：“论修改版的布雷顿森林体系”，国家经济研究局(National Bureau of Economic
Research)工作论文9971号，见www.nber.org |
* Michael P. Dooley, David
Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, "An Essay on the Revised Bretton Woods
System", Working Paper 9971, National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org
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译者/秋实 |
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