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安然、世通、泰科以及现今的帕玛拉特丑闻震惊了工商界，并推动了新法规条例的出台。不幸的是，这些法律干涉了合约的自由，而且有充分的理由相信，它们只会雪上加霜，而不会使形势好转。
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Scandals
at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and now Parmalat have shaken the business
world and prompted new laws and regulations. Unfortunately, these
laws interfere with freedom of contract and there are strong
reasons for thinking they will make things worse, not better.
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设想一下，你创办了一家公司，并希望公开上市。你必须既让投资者相信这家公司会成功，又要让他们相信内部人员不会窃取利润。因此，你起草了一份公司章程，规定了各种各样的保障条款。这就是你同股东间的合约。例如，该章程也许会明确说明一股一票，并禁止管理层对恶意收购采取防御性措施。或者，该章程也可能允许双层股票(dual-class
shares)，以及防止并购的措施。
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Imagine
that you have founded a company and want to take it public. You
have to convince investors not only that the company will be
successful but also that insiders will not steal the profits. So
you write a corporate charter that puts in place various
safeguards: this is your contract with the shareholders. For
example, the charter may specify one share one vote and prohibit
defensive measures by management against hostile bids. Or the
charter may permit dual-class shares and takeover defences.
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哪一个更好些呢？假设创始人想退休，到里维埃拉颐养天年。那么，第一种“亲股东的”章程可能更好，因为它能使股价上涨、创始人发财致富。但是如果创始人非常关心公司的运营，第二种“亲管理层的”章程也许不错，因为股东投资无需太高，但创始人将控制公司的未来。
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Which
is better? Suppose the founder wants to retire to the Riviera.
Then the first "pro-shareholder" charter may be good: it
leads to a high share price and makes the founder wealthy. But if
the founder cares passionately how the company is run, the second
"pro- management" charter may be good: shareholders will
not pay as much for the shares but the founder will have control
over the company's future.
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当然，政府对公司章程中关于“公开上市阶段”部分的监管没有引起太大争论。大多数经济学家和律师都信仰“合约自由”，即应该允许人们起草自己喜欢的合约。不过，当创始人最初起草章程时，他无法预测50年或100年后的世界形势。套用经济学家或律师的行话就是，公司章程是“不完整的合约”。
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Certainly
there does not seem to be a strong argument for government
regulation of the corporate charter at the "going
public" stage. Most economists and lawyers believe in
"freedom of contract": people should be allowed to write
the contracts they like. But when the founder writes the initial
charter, he cannot predict what the world will look like 50 or 100
years hence. To use the jargon of economists and lawyers,
corporate charters are "incomplete contracts".
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如何解释此类章程的问题，最终或许要诉诸法律。当80年代恶意收购浪潮席卷美国时，胆战心惊的上市公司经理和董事会引入了“毒丸”等反收购新手段，以击退恶意收购者。但他们的章程允许其使用此类手段吗？这有待法院裁决。在美国公司治理方面最重要的特拉华州法院裁定，毒药是合法的。虽然很多人认为这是个错误，但法院在填补不完整公司章程的缺口方面，已显示出重要作用。
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Questions
about how to interpret such charters may end up before the courts.
As hostile takeovers swept the US in the 1980s, scared managers
and boards of public companies introduced new techniques, such as
the "poison pill", to fight off hostile bidders. But did
their charters allow them to use such techniques? It was left to
the courts to decide. The Delaware courts, the most important in
the US for corporate governance, ruled that poison pills were OK.
Many people think this was a mistake. But the courts had
demonstrated their important role in filling in the gaps of
incomplete corporate charters.
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那么，哪些法规是合理的，哪些是不合理的呢？在有一种干预措施中，政府会否决某些章程条款，或要求公司以同原始章程的精神相抵触的方式，对其进行修改。在另一种干预措施中，法院决定以新的方法解释公司章程。
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So
which laws and regulations are good and which are bad? In one type
of intervention, the government disallows certain charter
provisions or requires corporate charters to be changed in ways
that contravene the spirit of the original charter. In the second
type of intervention, the courts decide to interpret corporate
charters in a new way.
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第一种形式类似于要求所有公司章程都是亲股东的。这干涉了合约自由，因此是不合理的。第二种则比较有道理。在如何填补不完整公司章程的缺口方面，法院有权酌情处理。或许，当它们想要提高效率时，没有理由不运用自己的酌处权。
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The
first type is like requiring all company charters to be pro-
shareholder. It interferes with freedom of contract and is bad.
The second type makes more sense. Courts have considerable
discretion in how they fill in the gaps of incomplete corporate
charters and there is no reason for them not to use their
discretion as they want, perhaps to enhance efficiency.
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这在哪方面脱离了最近的法规制度呢？不论美国的萨班斯－奥克斯利法案(连同证交所的新规定)还是英国的公司治理新法规，其重要目的均在于提高董事的独立性，减少利益冲突。比如在美国，上市公司的大多数董事必须是独立的，负责公司审计的事务所不能向该公司提供咨询服务。在英国，规则是劝诫式而非强制式的，其中一条规则要求，首席执行官不应担任或继续担任董事长。另一条规则要求，大公司董事会的半数成员应是独立的。
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Where
does that leave recent laws and regulations? An important aim of
both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (together with new stock
exchange rules) and the new code of corporate governance in the UK
is to increase directorial independence and reduce conflicts of
interest. For example, in the US, a majority of board members of
listed companies must be independent and the company's auditors
cannot provide consulting services for the company. In the UK,
swheresthe rules are exhortatory rather than compulsory, one rule
says the chief executive should not be, or go on to be, chairman.
A second rule says half the board members of a major company
should be independent.
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不幸的是，所有这些法规都属于第一种干预形式的范畴。毫无迹象表明，公司创始人或初期投资者曾经打算对其公司或董事会采取此类限制措施。它们推翻了创始人和投资者自愿达成的协议。这些人均未参与对不完整公司章程的解释。
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Unfortunately,
all these regulations fallsintosthe first category of
intervention. There is no sign that company founders or initial
investors ever intended such restrictions to be placed on their
companies or boards. They override agreements enteredsintos
voluntarily by founders and investors. None of them involves the
interpretation of incomplete corporate charters.
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因此，很难说为“修复”安然或帕玛拉特危机而仓促通过一系列法律是否是个好主意。它们干涉了合约自由，因此很可能会降低效率。另外，它们可能还会增加法律成本、浪费董事会的时间，并吓退一些公司的未来上市行动。
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It
is, therefore, far from clear that laws passed hurriedly to
"fix" an Enron or a Parmalat crisis are a good idea.
They are likely to reduce efficiency because they interfere with
freedom of contract. What is more, they are likely to increase
legal costs, waste board time and deter future companies from
going public.
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作者是哈佛大学经济学教授和伦敦经济学院客座教授。本文选自作者的拉菲尔＃马蒂奥里(Raffaele
Mattioli)系列讲座第一讲。
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The
writer is professor of economics at Harvard University and
visiting professor at the London School of Economics. The article
is drawn from the writer's first Raffaele Mattioli lecture
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译者/安娜
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