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The
Japanese economy is back. Or so optimists believe. But we have been here
before, in the brief recoveries of 1992, 1997 and 2000. That is a good
reason for scepticism. But there is something even more telling about this
recovery than that: it is happening more because Japan has not reformed
than because it has.
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Let
us start with the good news: the economy has now enjoyed seven successive
quarters of economic growth. According to the latest economic survey of
Japan from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
gross domestic product is set to rise by 2.7 per cent this year. Next
year, growth could be 1.8 per cent.
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±¾´Î¸´Ëյġ°½üÒò¡±ÊÇ´«Í³ÐԵġ£2002Ä꣬³ö¿ÚÔö³¤ÁË8.1%¡£ÔÚ½ø¿Ú½öÔö³¤2%µÄÇé¿öÏ£¬¾»³ö¿Ú×ÜÖµµÄÔöÁ¿Ï൱ÓÚGDPµÄ0.7%£¬´Ó¶øµÖÏúÁ˹úÄÚͶ×ʵÄÏ»¬£¬À¶¯ÁËÊʶȵľ¼ÃÔö³¤¡£½øÈë2003ÄêÖ®ºó£¬Ë½ÈË·ÇסլͶ×Ê¿ªÊ¼¼¤Ôö£¬Ô¤ÆÚ½ñÄêµÄÔö³¤ÂÊΪ10.3%£¬ÔÙ¼ÓÉÏÏ൱ÓÚ0.5%
GDPµÄ¾»³ö¿ÚÔöÁ¿£¬½ñÄêµÄÈÕ±¾¾¼Ã¾ÍʵÏÖÁËÁîÈËÂúÒâµÄ×ÜÌåÔö³¤¡£
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The
proximate causes of this recovery are traditional. In 2002, exports grew
by 8.1 per cent. With imports rising by only 2 per cent, net exports
increased by 0.7 per cent of GDP. This offset the decline in domestic
investment, to generate modest economic growth. Then, in 2003, private
non-residential investment picked up sharply, with growth forecast at 10.3
per cent. This has combined with growth in net exports of 0.5 per cent of
GDP to deliver satisfactory overall growth.
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ÎÒÔÚÏ룬ÔÚ×î½üÒ»´Î¶ÔÈÕ±¾¶«¾©µÄ·ÃÎÊÖУ¬ÕâÑùµÄÂÛÊöÔÚµ±µØ»áÔâÓöʲô·´Ó¦£¿´ð°¸ÊÇ¡°ÅªºýÍ¿ÁË¡±¡£ÔÚÈÕ±¾£¬±çÂÛ¸÷·½ÈÔÓëÒÔÇ°Ò»Ñù¹ÛµãåÄÒ죺ÆäÖаüÀ¨×¢ÖØ΢¹Û¾¼Ã¸Ä¸ïµÄ¡°¹©Ó¦Ñ§ÅÉ¡±£¬Ç¿µ÷ÐèÒª¶ÔÒøÐнøÐÐ×ʲúÖØ×éµÄ¡°ÒøÐÐѧÅÉ¡±£¬ÒÔ¼°ÓÉÖ÷ÕÅÔö´ó»õ±Ò·¢ÐÐÁ¿µÄ¡°»õ±ÒѧÅÉ¡±ºÍÖ÷ÕÅÔö´ó²ÆÕþ³à×ֵġ°²ÆÕþѧÅÉ¡±¹¹³ÉµÄ¡°ÐèÇóѧÅÉ¡±¡£µ«¸÷·½(ÖÁÉÙÔÚÖªÇéÕßÖмä)¿´À´¶¼ÈÏͬÁ½µã£ºÊ×ÏÈ£¬Íⲿ»·¾³ÆðÁ˿ɹ۵ÄÀ¶¯×÷Óã»Æä´Î£¬ÈÕ±¾ÑëÐÐÒÑ´ÓÎÊÌâµÄÒ»²¿·Öת±äΪ½â¾ö·½°¸µÄÒ»²¿·Ö¡£
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How,
I wondered during a recent visit, would this story look in Tokyo? Confused
is the answer. The debate remains as divided as before between
"supply-siders", who emphasise microeconomic reform, "bank-siders",
who emphasise the need to recapitalise the banks, and "demand-siders",
split, in turn, between monetarists, who demand more money, and fiscalists,
who recommend bigger fiscal deficits. But two points seem to be widely
agreed, at least among the insiders: first, the external sector is proving
a great boon; second, the Bank of Japan has moved from being part of the
problem towards being part of the solution.
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ÕâÁ½µã¶¼ÊÇÕýÈ·µÄ¡£½ØÖÁ2003ÄêÖÐÆÚµÄ18¸öÔ¼䣬ÈÕ±¾µÄ³ö¿Ú´ïµ½12%
µÄÄêÔö³¤ÂÊ£¬Æä¼äÓÐÈý·ÖÖ®Ò»µÄ³ö¿ÚÔöÁ¿ÊǶÔÒÔÖйúΪÊ×µÄÑÇÖÞÊг¡µÄ³ö¿Ú¡£Í¬Ê±£¬ÈÕ±¾ÑëÐÐÒ²Ò»¸ÄÆäÇ°ÈÎÐг¤ËÙË®ÓÅÔÚÈÎÆÚ¼äµÄÍÆÚÃÌÂÈû×÷·ç¡£ÔÚÑëÐжÊ»áµÄ¶àÊý³ÉÔ±Ô¤±¨ÕýÊýµÄͨÕÍÂÊ֮ǰ£¬ÆäйÜÀí²ã½«¼á¶¨·îÐÐÁãÀûÂʺͶ¨Á¿¿íËÉÒø¸ùÕþ²ß¡£
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Both
points are right. Exports rose at a 12 per cent annual rate during the 18
months through mid-2003. A third of the increase in exports over that
period was to Asian markets, led by China. Similarly, the prevarication of
the Bank of Japan under Masaru Hayami, its former governor, has gone.
Under its new management, the bank is committed to sustaining zero
interest rates and quantitative monetary easing until the majority of
board members forecast above-zero inflation.
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ÒªÖÎÓúÈÕ±¾µÄ¼²»¼£¬¸ü´óµÄ¾³£ÕÊ»§Ó¯ÓàºÍ¸ü»ý¼«µÄ»õ±ÒÕþ²ß¶¼ÊDZØÒªÌõ¼þ¡£ÈÕ±¾ÐèÒª½«ÆäÅÓ´ó˽ÈË´¢ÐîÖеĸü´óÒ»²¿·Ö³ö¿Ú¡£Ëü»¹ÐèҪͨ»õÅòÕÍ£¬¼®ÒÔ¼õÇá¹úÄÚÕ®ÎñµÄÖظº¡£µ«Æù½ñΪֹÈÕ±¾µÄ¸Ä¸ï²¢²»µ½Î»¡£
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A
bigger current account surplus and a more aggressive monetary policy are
necessary conditions for ending the Japanese malaise. Japan needs to
export more of its surplus private savings. It also needs inflation, to
reduce the overhang of domestic debt. But the changes so far are
inadequate.
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ÈÕ±¾µÄ¾³£ÕÊ»§Ó¯ÓàÈÔΪGDPµÄ´óÔ¼3%£¬Ô¶Ô¶²»×ãÒÔÔÚÏÖÓÐ˽Ӫ²¿ÃÅͶ×Êˮƽ(ÇÒ²»Ìá¾ùºâ״̬)Ö®ÉÏÎüÊÕ¶àÓàµÄ˽ÈË´¢ÐͬÑù£¬Òª½áÊø×Ô¶þÊ®ÊÀ¼Í¾ÅÊ®Äê´úÖÐÆÚÒÔÀ´Ò»Ö±³ÖÐøµÄͨ»õ½ôËõ£¬»õ±ÒÕþ²ß»¹²»¹»»ý¼«¡£È¥Ä꣬GDPËõ¼õÖ¸Êý
£¨ ¾¼ÃÌåÖм۸ñ±ä¶¯µÄ×î¹ã·ººâÁ¿³ß¶È £© ϽµÁË1.7%¡£¸ù¾ÝOECDµÄÔ¤²â£¬2003Ä껹½«ÔÙϽµ2.5%¡£¸üÓÐÉõÕߣ¬¸ù¾ÝOECDµÄÔ¤±¨£¬ÏÔÖøµÄ²ú³öȱ¿Ú
£¬ÒÔ¼°ÓÉ´ËÐγɵijÖÐøµÄͨËõѹÁ¦ £¬ ½«ÖÁÉÙ³ÖÐøµ½2005Äê¡£
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The
current account surplus is still about 3 per cent of GDP, which is far too
small to mop up the country's excess of private savings over current (let
alone equilibrium) levels of private investment. Similarly, monetary
policy is still not aggressive enough to end the deflation that has been
under way since the mid-1990s. The GDP deflator - the broadest measure of
price changes in the economy - fell by 1.7 per cent last year. According
to the OECD, it is set to fall by another 2.5 per cent in 2003. Moreover,
the OECD forecasts a significant output gap - and so persistent
deflationary pressure - at least until 2005.
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²»¹ý£¬ÕâЩ»¹²»Êdzֻ³ÒÉ̬¶ÈÕßµÄËùÓÐÒÀ¾Ý¡£ÈÏΪÈÕ±¾ÃæÁٽṹÐÔȱÏݵÄÈËÊǶԵģ¬Ö»²»¹ýËûÃÇͨ³£²»ÄÜÕýÈ·µØÈÏÇåÎÊÌ⣬ÒòΪÕâЩÎÊÌâÖ÷ÒªÊÇÔÚºê¹Û¾¼Ã¶ø²»ÊÇ΢¹Û¾¼Ã²ãÃæ¡£×îÃ÷ÏÔµÄÌصãÖ®Ò»¾ÍÊÇͶ×ʹý¶ÈµÄÆóÒµ½ç¡£ÓëÀú´Î¸´ËÕÒ»Ñù£¬±¾´Î¸´ËÕÒ²Êǽ¨Á¢ÔÚ˽Ӫ²¿ÃÅͶ×ʼ¤ÔöµÄ»ù´¡ÉÏ£¬Òò¶øҲͬÑùÊDz»Àο¿µÄ¡£
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These
are not the only reasons for doubt, however. Those who argue that the
country faces structural handicaps are right. It is just that they usually
fail to identify them correctly, since they are more macroeconomic than
microeconomic. Among the most significant features is a corporate sector
that invests far too much. For this reason the present recovery, which is
built, as usual, on a surge in private investment, rests on sand.
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ÔÚÆÊÎöÈÕ±¾ÆóÒµ½çÐÐΪµÄ¹Å¹Ö³Ì¶È·½Ã棬ûÓÐÈ˱ÈÓ¢¹úÂ׶Ø×Éѯ»ú¹¹Smithers
& CoµÄ°²µÂ³•Ê·ÃÜɪ˹(Andrew Smithers)¸üΪ͸³¹¡£Èçͼ±íËùʾ£¬ÈÕ±¾µÄÆóҵͶ×ÊÕ¼GDPµÄ·Ý¶îÒ»Ïò¸ßÓÚÃÀ¹ú¡£µ«¹ýȥʮÄêÀ´ÃÀ¹ú¾¼ÃÿÄêÒÔ³¬¹ý3%¶àÒ»µãµÄÔö³¤ÂÊÎȲ½Ç°½ø£¬¶øͬÆÚÈÕ±¾¾¼Ã½öÒÔÂÔ¸ßÓÚ1%µÄÄêÔö³¤ÂÊõçõǶøÐС£
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Andrew
Smithers, of London-based Smithers & Co, has done more than anybody
else to explain how peculiar the behaviour of the Japanese corporate
sector is. As the chart shows, the share of corporate investment in
Japanese GDP has been consistently higher than in the US. Yet the US
economy has been growing at a little over 3 per cent a year over the past
10 years, while Japan's has limped along at just over 1 per cent.
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ÁíÒ»·½Ã棬ÃÀ¹úµÄÀͶ¯Á¦ÈËÊýÿÄêÔö³¤´óÔ¼1%£¬¶øÈÕ±¾µÄÀͶ¯Á¦ÈËÊýÿÄê¼õÉÙ0.5%¡£Á½Õ߶¼Ê¹ÈËÔ¤ÆÚÃÀ¹úµÄÆóҵͶ×Ê»á´ó´ó¸ßÓÚÈÕ±¾¡£¼ÙÈçÕâÁ½¸ö¾¼ÃÌ嶼ͬÑù¾ßÓоºÕùÁ¦£¬¶Ô¹ú¼Ê×ʱ¾Êг¡Ò²Í¬Ñù¿ª·Å£¬Çé¿öȷʵ»áÕâÑù¡£µ«Ö¤¾ÝÏÔʾʵ¼ÊÇé¿ö²¢·ÇÈç´Ë¡£
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The
US labour force is also growing at about 1 per cent a year, while the
Japanese labour force is shrinking at 0.5 per cent a year. Both of these
are reasons for expecting corporate investment to be substantially higher
in the US than in Japan. If both economies were equally competitive and
open to international capital markets, that would be the case. The
evidence shows they are not.
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ÓÉÓÚÈÕ±¾Ã¿Ôö²úÒ»¸öGDPµ¥Î»ËùÐèµÄ×ʱ¾¼¸ºõΪÃÀ¹úµÄÈý±¶£¬ÈÕ±¾µÄ×ʱ¾»Ø±¨ÂÊÏÔÈ»µÍµÃ¶à£¬¿ÉÄÜ»¹²»µ½ÃÀ¹úµÄÒ»°ë¡£¼ÙÉ裬°´ÕÕ¹©Ó¦Ñ§ÅɵÄÖ÷ÕÅ£¬ÈÕ±¾ÕûÌåÀͶ¯Éú²úÂʵÄÔö³¤Ô¶Ô¶¿ìÓÚÃÀ¹ú£¬Õâ¸öÄÑÌâÒ²Ðí»áÓÈжø½â¡£ÀíÂÛÉÏ£¬ÕâÖÖ¼ÙÉè²¢·ÇÍêÈ«²»¿ÉÄܳÉΪÏÖʵ£¬ÒòΪĿǰÈÕ±¾¹¤È˵ÄÿСʱ²ú³öÖ»´ïµ½ÃÀ¹úˮƽµÄ70%¡£µ«ÊÂʵÊÇÈËÃÇ¿´²»µ½´ËµÈ¸´Ð˵ÄË¿ºÁ¼£Ïó¡£Ïà·´£¬¹ýȥʮÄêÀ´ÈÕ±¾ÀͶ¯Éú²úÂʵÄÔö³¤·ù¶ÈÒ»Ö±ÔÚϽµ£¬Ä¿Ç°µÍÓÚÿÄê2%¡£
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Because
it takes almost three times as much capital to produce an additional unit
of GDP in Japan as in the US, Japanese returns on capital must be much
lower, probably less than half. This might cease to be the case if, as the
supply-siders believe, aggregate productivity growth were to rise far more
quickly than in the US. That is not inconceivable, since Japan's output
per hour is only 70 per cent of US levels. But no sign of such a
renaissance can be seen. On the contrary, the growth of labour
productivity has been falling in the past decade, to below 2 per cent a
year.
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ÄÇô£¬ÎªÊ²Ã´ÈÕ±¾ÆóÒµµÄͶ×Êˮƽһֱ¾Ó¸ß²»ÏÂÄØ£¿ÔÒòÖ®Ò»ÊÇ£¬Î´¾¸Ä¸ïµÄÈÕ±¾ÆóÒµ½ç£¬ÒÀÈ»²»°Ñ»Ø±¨¹É¶«µ±Ò»»ØÊ¡£ÁíÒ»¸öÔÒòÊÇ£¬ÓÉÓÚδÄÜÀí½âͨËõµÄÓ°Ï죬¶ÔÓ¯ÀûÄÜÁ¦µÄºâÁ¿ÓÐÎó¡£ÔÚͨ»õ½ôËõµÄ¾¼ÃÌåÖУ¬Êµ¼ÊÀûÂʸßÓÚÃûÒåÀûÂÊ¡£¶ÔÓÚ¸ºÕ®ÀÛÀÛµÄÆóÒµ½ç¶øÑÔ£¬Õâ»á¶Ô¹É±¾»Ø±¨ÂʲúÉúÖØ´óÓ°Ïì¡£±ÈÈ磬¼ÆÈë×ʲú¼Û¸ñµÄ±ä¶¯ºó£¬¹É±¾»Ø±¨Âʾ¹´ÓÕýÊýµÄ5%
±äΪ¸ºÊýµÄ5% (¼ûͼ±í)¡£
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Why
then does investment remain so stubbornly high? One reason is that the
unreformed Japanese corporate sector is indifferent to returns to
shareholders. Another is that profitability is mismeasured, because of the
failure to understand the implications of deflation. Under deflation, real
interest rates are higher than nominal ones. For a highly indebted
corporate sector, this makes a huge difference to returns on equity.
Adjusted for changes in asset prices, for example, the return on equity
moves from plus 5 per cent to minus 5 per cent (see chart).
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ÕâÖÖ·ÖÎöÒâζ×Å£¬±¾´Î¸´ËÕÄܹ»³ÖÐø£¬Ö»²»¹ýÊÇÒòΪÈÕ±¾µÄÆóÒµÔÚ¼ÌÐøÀË·Ñ×ʱ¾¡£»»¾ä»°Ëµ£¬Ç¡Ç¡ÊÇÒòΪÊ×ÏàСȪ´¿Ò»Àɶԡ°ÈÕ±¾¹«Ë¾¡±µÄ¾ÓªÊøÊÖÎ޲ߣ¬²ÅÔì¾ÍÁ˵±Ç°µÄͶ×ʸ´ËÕ¡£µ«Ò²ÕýÊdzöÓÚͬÑùµÄÔÒò£¬ÕâÑùµÄ¸´ËÕ²»Ì«¿ÉÄܳ־᣼´Ê¹¶ÔÓÚÊܵ½²ã²ã±£»¤£¬²»¶Ô×ʱ¾Êг¡¿ª·ÅµÄÈÕ±¾ÆóÒµ½çÀ´Ëµ£¬Ëðʧ½ðǮҲ²»ÊÇÃ÷ÖÇ¿ÉÐеij¤ÆÚ³ö·¡£
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One
implication of this analysis is that, to the extent that this recovery
lasts, it can only be because Japanese companies continue to waste
capital. It is, in other words, only because Junichiro Koizumi, the prime
minister, has made so little difference to the operations of Japan Inc
that an investment-led recovery is under way. But it is unlikely to last,
for the same reason. Losing money is not a sound long-run proposition even
for a corporate sector as well-shielded from capital markets as the
Japanese.
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ÈÕ±¾µÄÏÖ×´ÊÇÒ»ÇÐÒÀÈ»Èç¹Ê¡£¸Ã¹úÕýµÃÒæÓÚº£Íâ¾¼ÃÔö³¤¼°Æä¶ÔÓÚ×ÔÉí¼²»¼Ö¢×´µÄÓÐЧ¹ÜÀí¡£ÕâÖÖ×ö·¨×ÔȻûÓÐÖα¾ÄÇôʹ¿à¡£µ«¾àÀëÖÎÓúµÄ¾³½ç£¬ÈÕ±¾Ò»Èç¼ÈÍùµØÏà¾àÒ£Ô¶¡£
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What
is happening at the moment is business as usual. Japan is benefiting from
growth overseas, together with successful management of the domestic
symptoms of its disease. That is certainly less painful than treatment.
But Japan is as far from a cure as ever.
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martin.wolf@ft.com
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martin.wolf@ft.com
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